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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2543 
 ___________ 
 
 ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR, 
 




LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;  
ADA PRIDDY, Adjuster; KAREN KUEBLER, Esq.;  
THE LAW OFFICES OF LINDA BAUMAN, ESQ. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00146) 
 District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 13, 2012 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 







 Assem A. Abulkhair appeals the District Court’s order denying his pro se “motion 
for extension of time to file an appeal,” which the District Court properly construed as a 
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motion to reopen the time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).  
We will summarily affirm. 
 The background can be stated briefly.  In 2010, the District Court dismissed 
Abulkhair’s complaint in this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  This Court 
affirmed the dismissal, see Abulkhair v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 11-1584, 441 F. 
App’x 927 (3d Cir. 2011), and issued an amended mandate awarding costs to defendants 
in the amount of $276.54, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  On December 8, 2011, the District Court enforced this Court’s amended 
mandate by entering an Order and Judgment reflecting the costs awarded on appeal.   
 On March 26, 2012, Abulkhair filed a motion to reopen his time to appeal the 
December 8, 2011, Order and Judgment, asserting that he did not receive notice of the 
judgment until March 23, 2012.  Defendants opposed reopening the appeal period, and 
the District Court denied Abulkhair’s motion.  It explained that, while Abulkhair satisfied 
the requirements of subparts (A) and (B) of Rule 4(a)(6), he did not satisfy subpart (C), 
which requires the District Court to find that “no party would be prejudiced” by 
reopening the time to appeal.  The District Court observed that there is no basis for 
Abulkhair to appeal the judgment awarding appellate costs, that defendants should not be 
made to defend against a meritless appeal, and that Abulkhair had the opportunity to 
appeal this Court’s award but failed to do so.  Abulkhair timely filed this appeal. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the denial of a 
Rule 4(a)(6) motion for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192, 
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195 (3d Cir. 2006).  Rule 4(a)(6) “provides a mechanism for granting an extension of 
time when a party would be unfairly deprived of an appeal because of the failure of a 
court clerk.”  Marcangelo v. Boardwalk Regency, 47 F.3d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1995).  The 
district court must find, inter alia, “that no party would be prejudiced” by reopening the 
appeal period.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(C); see Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 454 
(3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that “Rule 4(a)(6) provides a limited opportunity to reopen the 
time to file an appeal when certain conditions are met”).   
 We agree with the District Court that an appeal of its judgment based on this 
Court’s award of costs would be frivolous, taken in bad faith, and prejudicial to 
defendants.  Our docket in No. 11-1584 reflects that defendants timely filed a bill of costs 
after this Court entered judgment in their favor and taxed costs for the appeal against 
Abulkhair pursuant to Rule 39.  Abulkhair filed objections to the bill of costs.  The Clerk 
issued an order addressing and rejecting each objection, and she awarded costs in the 
amount of $276.54.  Abulkhair filed objections to the Clerk’s order.  A panel of this 
Court overruled and denied those objections.  An amended mandate was issued, in 
accordance with Rule 39(d), reflecting the costs taxed against Abulkhair.  Upon receipt of 
the amended mandate, the District Court issued a notice directing defendants to prepare 
and submit an order implementing this Court’s mandate.  Defendants timely complied, 
and the District Court entered its Order and Judgment reflecting the costs awarded.   
 Given this record, it is clear that this Court has already heard and rejected 
Abulkhair’s arguments in opposition to the costs imposed for his prior appeal.  Abulkhair 
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is not entitled to rehash those arguments by filing another appeal.  Consequently, we are 
satisfied that an appeal from the December 8, 2001, Order and Judgment would be 
frivolous, not only because such an appeal would be inarguable as a matter of law, see 
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), but also because a “reasonable paying 
litigant” would not part with $455 (the cost in filing fees to bring an appeal) in order to 
challenge a judgment entered against him for the substantially lesser sum of $276.54.  
See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1090 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 We acknowledge that the merits of a potential appeal ordinarily “are not a 
permissible consideration” in deciding whether to afford Rule 4(a)(6) relief.  Arai v. Am. 
Bryce Ranches Inc., 316 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003).  But under the particular 
circumstances presented here, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its 
discretion in finding that defendants would be prejudiced by any further litigation of the 
Rule 39 costs issue.  We are cognizant, as well, of Abulkhair’s history of taking meritless 
in forma pauperis appeals to this Court.  Finally, we note that, even if we concluded that 
Abulkhair had satisfied the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6), we would still affirm the denial 
of his motion to reopen.  A district court retains discretion to deny a Rule 4(a)(6) motion 
“even when the rule’s requirements are met.”  Arai, 316 F.3d at 1069.  The circumstances 
of this case counsel against reopening the time for Abulkhair to appeal. 
 For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Abulkhair’s Rule 4(a)(6) motion.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
